{"id":4896,"date":"2026-11-06T09:54:36","date_gmt":"2026-11-06T07:54:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ajmonnet.eu\/?p=4896"},"modified":"2026-11-07T14:12:19","modified_gmt":"2026-11-07T12:12:19","slug":"conference-de-bruxelles-sur-la-politique-europeenne-de-defense","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ajmonnet.eu\/en\/conference-de-bruxelles-sur-la-politique-europeenne-de-defense\/","title":{"rendered":"Brussels Conference on European Defence Policy"},"content":{"rendered":"
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The Brussels conference on 1 October was designed as an opportunity to put forward an initial proposal for a European defence policy (EDP) for open debate amongst representatives of the European institutions, think tanks, the defence community, academia, business and the financial sector. Its aim was not to seek approval for a predefined model, but to test its assumptions, identify its weaknesses and explore the political, institutional, industrial and financial conditions necessary to make a more integrated European defence policy credible and sustainable.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

The debate fully achieved this objective. The contributions were neither unanimous nor always in line with the initial proposal. This was one of the most valuable outcomes of the Conference. Different approaches emerged regarding the meaning of rearmament and deterrence, the relationship between defence and foreign policy, the degree of sovereignty that should be shared, the appropriate institutional framework, the relationship with NATO and the United States, and the pace at which European defence integration can realistically progress. At the same time, a broad consensus emerged regarding the inadequacy of the current fragmentation of European defence and the need for Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One important initial finding concerned the relationship between peace-building and military capabilities.<\/strong> The initial proposal emphasised that a European defence policy should not simply become a collection of 27 national rearmament programmes. Several speakers nevertheless stressed that credible deterrence and stronger military capabilities are essential, particularly if Europe wishes to prevent war and safeguard peace. The discussion therefore helped to clarify an important distinction. The choice is not between peace-building and defence, nor between diplomacy and deterrence. The real question is whether additional resources will perpetuate the fragmentation of national systems or contribute to the establishment of a genuine European capacity for deterrence, decision-making and action.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This represents an important clarification of the initial approach. A European defence policy can remain fundamentally peace-oriented whilst recognising that credible military capabilities are one of the prerequisites for protecting peace, European citizens and the values on which the European project is founded.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The conference\u2019s second major contribution centred on the order in which European defence integration should take place.<\/strong> The debate on effectiveness, scale and industrial integration has shown that Europe cannot simply start by asking its defence industries to consolidate or by purchasing more equipment. Strategy comes before procurement. Consolidation of demand comes before industrial consolidation. Europe must therefore move gradually from a common assessment of threats and strategic objectives to common operational requirements, the identification of capability gaps, greater standardisation and interoperability, joint procurement and, where appropriate, industrial consolidation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This approach lends greater substance to the principle that Europe should not be content with not to spend more, but to spend more wisely together.<\/strong> Economies of scale cannot be achieved if governments continue to commission different systems in small-scale domestic production runs. At the same time, the conference warned against treating defence as a mere extension of the single market. Security of supply, strategic technologies, national responsibilities and the political legitimacy of defence spending make it a market with very specific characteristics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Industrial capacity itself therefore becomes a component of security. Production capacity, a skilled workforce, critical components and raw materials, resilient supply chains, ammunition and spare parts, strategic infrastructure and the ability to rapidly scale up production in the event of a crisis are all part of Europe\u2019s defence capability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The conference confirmed the importance of governance, but also revealed significant differences regarding the institutional path to be followed. The proposal for a A Delors-style committee was the subject of<\/strong> requires considerable attention. Historical experience suggests that such a committee can only be effective if political leaders first set out a sufficiently clear objective and give independent and authoritative figures a specific mandate to determine how that objective can be achieved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, different viewpoints emerged regarding the scope of the institutional framework from the outset. Some contributions strongly argued that defence and a common European foreign policy are inseparable. Others felt that attempting to build a fully-fledged Union of Foreign Affairs and Defence immediately might hinder progress and suggested a more pragmatic or subsidiary approach.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Similar differences arose regarding sovereignty. There was strong support for overcoming the deadlock caused by the unanimity rule and for more effective European decision-making, but less agreement on the extent to which national sovereignty should be transferred rather than shared or exercised jointly. Among the ideas deserving further consideration were a European Security Council,<\/strong> decision-making by qualified majority, a Schengen-style approach involving a group of willing countries, and arrangements allowing for the participation of non-EU European partners of strategic importance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These differences should not be seen as a weakness of the Conference. On the contrary, they pinpoint precisely the institutional issues that require further work. The relationship between European strategic autonomy and NATO has also emerged in a more nuanced form than a simple choice between European defence and the Atlantic Alliance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Several speakers suggested that Europe should strengthen NATO\u2019s European pillar whilst developing capabilities that would enable Europeans to act when US assets or political commitment cannot be taken for granted. This applies not only to weapons, but also to strategic enablers: intelligence and surveillance, space assets, strategic transport, in-flight refuelling, logistics, command and control, and other capabilities on which Europe has often relied heavily on the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Strategic autonomy can therefore be understood not so much as a separation from allies as the the ability of Europeans to take political decisions and take action when necessary,<\/strong> whilst maintaining interoperability with NATO. Ukraine has also become an indispensable partner and a source of operational and technological expertise. At the same time, the speakers warned against shaping Europe\u2019s future defence exclusively around the characteristics of the current war. Europe must learn from Ukraine whilst preparing for conflicts and security challenges that may take very different forms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of the most significant developments concerned funding.<\/strong> The initial proposal had already recognised that public budgets alone could not cover the full scope of the discussion and had envisaged mobilising institutional and individual savings through appropriate public-private instruments (progress report on the European think tanks\u2019 initiative, July 2026). The key contributions from the 4th Session gave this issue much greater prominence by bringing the perspective of private investors directly into the European defence debate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One important conclusion emerged: the existence of vast reserves of European savings does not automatically lead to investment in European security. Private capital requires credible projects, appropriate financial instruments, predictable regulatory conditions, an acceptable distribution of risks and sufficiently clear industrial prospects. Private capital can therefore to complement, but not replace, public responsibility for defence.<\/strong> Core military functions will continue to rely primarily on public funding. Private and institutional capital can make a particularly significant contribution to industrial expansion, technological innovation, infrastructure and dual-use activities where projects offer credible investment prospects.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This also establishes a direct link between the discussions at the second and fourth sessions: in the absence of common priorities, foreseeable procurements and credible industrial programmes, financial engineering alone cannot build European defence capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, several speakers reminded the Conference that European defence cannot be reduced to the armed forces, industry or finance. A sustainable security policy requires democratic legitimacy, public understanding and social cohesion. Europeans must know not only how<\/strong> Europe intends to defend itself, but as well as what she stands for<\/strong>: democracy, freedom, human dignity, pluralism, solidarity and the ability of European societies to determine their future peacefully. This brings the discussion back to the initiative\u2019s original objective. The July 2026 follow-up report described European integration itself as one of the great post-war peace projects and placed peace-building, security, human rights and development at the heart of the proposed Union.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The debate in Brussels did not result in a single proposal, nor was that to be expected. It produced something more useful at this stage: a programme offering a wider range of questions, alternatives and possible solutions, which now require more in-depth analysis.<\/strong> The path towards a genuine European defence policy will inevitably be a long one and could extend well beyond a decade. What matters is to start on a sound political, strategic and economic footing. The Brussels Conference made a significant contribution to this objective by identifying areas of common ground, highlighting genuine differences and introducing new dimensions to the debate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For this reason, the organisers would like to express their sincere gratitude to all the speakers, moderators and participants. The quality, openness and diversity of their contributions made the conference more productive than originally anticipated and provided valuable input for the next stage of a project which, by its very nature, can only develop through ongoing dialogue between the European institutions, civil society, experts, industry and financial stakeholders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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This conference<\/a> The speakers from the Jean Monnet Association were:<\/p>\n\n\n\n